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Abstract—Detecting dense subgraphs from large graphs is
a core component in many applications, ranging from social
networks mining, bioinformatics, to online fraud detection. In
this paper, we focus on mining dense subgraphs in a bipartite
graph. The work is motivated by the task of fraud detection that
can often be formulated as mining a bipartite graph formed
by the source nodes (followers, customers) and target nodes
(followees, products, etc.) for malicious patterns. We introduce a
new restricted biclique problem, Maximal Half Isolated Biclique
(MHI Biclique), and show that the problem finds immediate
applications in fraud detection. We prove that, unlike many other
biclique problems such as the maximum edge biclique problem
that are known to be NP-Complete, the MHI Biclique problem
admits a linear time solution. We provide a novel algorithm S-
tree, and its extension, S-forest, that solves the problem efficiently.
We also demonstrate that the algorithms are robust against
deliberate camouflaging and other perturbations. Furthermore,
our approach can automatically combine and prioritize multiple
features, reducing the need for feature engineering while main-
taining security against unseen attacks. Extensive experiments
on several public and proprietary datasets demonstrate that S-
tree/S-forest outperforms strong rivals across all configurations,
becoming the new state of the art in fraud detection.
Index Terms—Biclique, Dense Subgraph, Fraud Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Dense subgraph detection is a major topic in algorithmic
graph theory and their applications can be found in a wide
range of real-world scenarios such as social network analysis
[1], link spam detection [2], and bioinformatics [3], etc. In
many graphs that model interactions among users (e.g., a social
network) or between users and a platform (e.g., an e-commerce
site), dense subgraphs tend to signal interesting phenomena or
indicate a group of accomplices.
In this paper, we focus on mining dense subgraphs in a
bipartite graph. The work is motivated by the task of fraud
detection that can often be formulated as mining a bipartite
graph formed by source nodes (followers, customers) and
target nodes (followees, products, etc.) for malicious patterns.
Fraud is a serious problem in our society, especially in online
social applications (OSA) such as Amazon, Twitter, Weibo,
etc. The interactions between users and the platform can
be modeled as a bipartite graph G between source nodes
(accounts) and target nodes (e.g., followee, products, etc.). In
a common scenario, fraudsters try to manipulate the ranking of
some specific objects on OSA by creating fake edges (follows,
reviews, etc.) from the accounts they control. Since fraudsters
are bounded in resources, and they are trying to maximize
financial gains, fraud groups (fake accounts and their collusive
customers) inevitably exhibit synchronized behavior, forming
dense subgraphs in G.
Fraud detection is an area of active research. Many
works try to detect such dense subgraphs using belief
propagation(BP)[4], [5], HITS[6]-like ideas [7], [8], singu-
lar value decomposition (SVD)[9], [10], or greedy pruning
[11], [12], [2], [13]. In its simplest forms, fraud groups are
likely to form bicliques (a complete bipartite graph) in G.
Unfortunately, finding all maximal bicliques cannot be solved
in polynomial time. This is further complicated by fraudsters
trying to disguise themselves as normal users, a tactic known
as “camouflaging”. This is typically done by adding edges
from fraudulent source nodes to legit target nodes. Existing
approaches are either inefficient or ineffective in the presence
of camouflage.
Another challenge in fraud detection is that fraud groups
display synchronized behavior only on certain dimensions
(e.g., IP address, phones, etc.), which are unknown in advance
and may change across groups and time. Treating all features
equally will be misled by irrelevant features. Effective fraud
detection often requires heavy feature engineering.
Our Contributions We formulate fraud detection as a
restricted case of biclique mining and give it a rigorous treat-
ment. We observe that most fraud subgraphs are half isolated,
meaning that they connect to other nodes only through at
most one side. For example, it is easy for fraudsters to create
edges from the accounts they control to other nodes (including
legit nodes), but is rare for fraud nodes to gain edges from
legit users. We introduce the Maximal Half Isolated (MHI)
Biclique problem which admits a linear time solution. By
utilizing an efficient and scalable algorithm, the model can
not only run faster, handle more data, but also detect all MHI
biclques and frauds more accurately. This is in contrast to other
solutions relying on heuristics or approximation. Concretely,
our contributions are summarized as follows.
• [A New Graph Problem]. We introduce a new restricted
biclique problem, Maximal Half Isolated Biclique (MHI
Biclique), and show that the problem finds immediate
applications in fraud detection.
• [A Linear Algorithm]. We propose a novel data struc-
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TABLE I: S-tree/S-forest v.s. other fraud detection methods
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Handling multimodel data ? × × × √ × √ √
Camouflage resistant?
√ × × ? × ? √
Linear time? × × × × × × √
ture, S-tree, and a mining algorithm, that solves the MHI
Biclique problem in linear time. The algorithm is effective
for detecting unbalanced dense sub-bipartite graphs. We
provide theoretical proofs regarding the algorithm’s effec-
tiveness and robustness against adversarial perturbations.
• [Practical Algorithms for Fraud Detection]. Based
on the S-tree-based MHI Biclique problem solver, we
introduce a new algorithm that detects near bicliques and
can be used to catch a wide range of fraud groups. The
algorithm has several advantages compared with other
fraud detection algorithms, summarized in Table I.
• [Automatic Feature Prioritization]. We further extend
S-tree to S-forest to handle multimodal data. S-forest
can utilize both structural or graph data representing the
relations between objects and attribute data characterizing
individual objects. Furthermore, S-forest can automati-
cally combine and prioritize multiple features, reducing
the need for feature engineering.
• [Effectiveness on Real-world Data]. We conducted
extensive experiments on thirteen real-world datasets,
including twelve public datasets and one proprietary data
collected from the production system log of a major e-
commerce vendor. Our solution outperforms strong rivals
across all configurations, becoming the new state of the
art in fraud detection.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Graph modeling
Consider a bipartite graph G = (V,E) with vertex set V
and edge set E where V = N ∪M consists of two disjoint
subsets: a set of source nodes N = {n1, ..., n|N |} and a set
of target nodes M = {m1, ...,m|M |}. (n,m) ∈ E denotes
an edge between n ∈ N and m ∈ M . We formulate the
fraud detection problem in two modes. In both cases, N are
user accounts, some of which are controlled by fraudsters.
The two differ by how they construct M . In the first case,
elements in M are objects, the entities whose ranking the
fraudsters try to manipulate. Examples include followees on
Twitter, products on Amazon, etc. In the second mode, M
consists of resources that the users use to interact with the
platform (e.g., IP addresses, timestamps, device IDs, etc).
This mode typically involves multiple dimensions and we
model them using multiple bipartite graphs. We call the first
mode account-object bipartite graph (AOBG) and the second
account-resource graph (ARBG). As will be shown later, fraud
activities display remarkable synchrony in both cases and our
scheme handles them in a uniform way. For any specific fraud
TABLE II: Symbols and Definitions
Symbols Definition
N The set of source nodes, N = {n1, ..., n|N|}
M The set of target nodes, M = {m1, ...,m|M|}
G The bipartite graph, G = (V,E), V = M ∪N
N A subset of N
M A subset of M
G A subgraph of G
B(m) The basket of m, B(m) = {m, I(m), f(m)}
T The suspiciousness tree (S-tree)
x A node of T , which has three fields: sn, sus, and tn
detection problem, practitioners are free to choose either mode
or combine both to achieve optimal results.
Our goal is to detect a subset of source nodes N that are
likely to be involved in fraud activities. Table II gives the list
of symbols we use throughout the paper.
B. Fraud Attack
Most frauds are conducted for financial gains. To reduce
cost, fraudsters operate on limited resources (e.g., phone num-
bers, IP addresses, time etc.) and also resort to economies of
scale to maximize profits [14]. As a result, fraudulent accounts
exhibit unusually synchronized patterns compared to the legit
users, forming dense subgraphs on G. This has been the key
signal that many fraud detection works[8], [15], [11], [12]
try to capture. Similarly, with multi-dimensional data, fraud
activities often form dense regions in tensor models, which has
been observed in network intrusion[2], bot activities[2], and
genetic applications[3]. In this section, we first introduce a few
precise definitions describing the dense regions phenomena
in a bipartite graph G and will use them to analyze various
properties of our algorithm.
Definition 1 (Isolated ρ-Synchronized Subgraph G(N ,M, ρ)).
Given a bipartite graph G = (V = N ∪M,E). Let N ⊂ N
and M ⊂ M . The subgraph induced by (N ,M), denoted
G(N ,M, ρ), is isolated and ρ-synchronized if (1) ∀m ∈ M,
if there exists an edge (c,m) ∈ E, it must be that c ∈ N ;
(2) ∀n ∈ N , if there exists an edge (n, c) ∈ E, it must be
that c ∈ M; and (3) ∀n ∈ N ,∃W ⊆ M such that ∀m ∈ W
there exists an edges (n,m) ∈ E. ρ, called the synchrony of
the subgraph, is defined as
ρ =
|W|
|M| ,
where |W| is the mean for all |W|s.
When ρ = 1, Definition 1 represents an extremely simple
type of fraud pattern: fraudulent accounts and target nodes
form a biclique that is disconnected from other parts of the
network. Although naive, this is the core pattern that fraud
detection algorithms try to capture [8], [9], [5], [11]. To avoid
detection, fraudsters often “camouflage” their activities by
introducing additional edges in the graph [11], making the
subgraph both less synchronized (ρ < 1 if all connected nodes
are included) and not isolated. An effective detection algorithm
must be robust against camouflaging and other perturbations.
Camouflaging can be classified into two types:
Definition 2 (Active Camouflage (A-Cam)). Given
G(N ,M, ρ), let Mˆ be a set of target nodes and Mˆ∩M = ∅.
Then we use G(N ,M, ρ)+ A-Cam to denote the subgraph
induced by (N ,M) where ∀m ∈ Mˆ, there exists an edge
(n,m) ∈ E, n ∈ N .
In practice, fraudsters can easily add edges from N toM as
well as to target nodes outsideM, since they control the fraud
source nodes in N (Definition 2). This pattern is frequently
observed in social networks [11], [8].
Definition 3 (Passive Camouflage (P-Cam)). Given
G(N ,M, ρ), let Nˆ be a set of source nodes and Nˆ ∩N = ∅.
Then we use G(N ,M, ρ)+ P-Cam to denote the subgraph
induced by (N ,M) where ∀n ∈ Nˆ , there exists an edge
(n,m) ∈ E, m ∈M.
P-Cam models the situations where some legit users add
edges to fraudulent nodes in M by accident or share some
resources (e.g., IP addresses, devices, etc.) with fraud groups.
It is not very frequent, since legit users are out of fraudster’s
control, but is indeed possible. For example, we have observed
that on a popular Chinese microblogging website, the system
sometimes make users involuntarily follow some accounts.
Also, explicitly modeling P-Cam makes it clearer to analyze
the problem and algorithms.
C. A Biclique Problem with Linear Solution
The definitions introduced earlier are closely related to the
concept of biclique in bipartite graphs. A biclique is a com-
plete sub-bipartite graph that contains all permissible edges,
which, according to definition 1, is essentially a subgraph with
synchrony ρ = 1 (but not necessarily isolated). A biclique is
said to be maximal if it is not contained in any other bicliques.
The vertex maximum biclique problem and the edge maximum
biclique problem are two distinct well-known problems in
bipartite graphs. The former can be solved in polynomial time
[16], while the latter is NP-complete[17].
Finding all maximal bicliques in bipartite graphs, the
maximal biclique enumeration problem, cannot be solved in
polynomial time [18], because it contains all edge maximum
and vertex maximum bicliques. Detecting them would be
intractable. Inspired by real-world fraud attack patterns, we
introduce a novel, more restricted biclique problem that cap-
tures the essence of group synchrony in the fraud activities
yet admits a linear algorithm. A maximal biclique has no
constraint on how it is connected to the other nodes of the
graph. Now we introduce the notion of half isolated biclique
that only allows edges to outside nodes from at most one part
of the subgraph. Formally,
Definition 4 (Half Isolated Biclique (HI Biclique)). In a bi-
partite graph G = (N ∪M,E), a subgraph G = (N ∪M, E)
is a half isolated biclique if (1) G is a biclique (∀n ∈ N ,m ∈
M, (n,m) ∈ E); (2) { ∀(m ∈ M) ∧ (m /∈ M), n ∈
N , then (n,m) /∈ E } or { ∀(n ∈ N) ∧ (n /∈ N ),m ∈
M, then (n,m) /∈ E }.
Based on this definition, we propose the notion of maximal
half isolated biclique.
Definition 5 (Maximal Half Isolated Biclique (MHI Biclique)).
In a bipartite graph G = (N ∪ M,E), a subgraph G =
(N ∪M, E) is a maximal half isolated biclique if (1) G is
a HI biclique; (2) there does not exist a HI biclique G1 =
(N1 ∪M1, E) where N1 ⊇ N and M1 ⊇M.
An MHI biclique is essentially a biclique with at least one
of its parts (N or M) isolated. Even though restricted, MHI
bicliques still cover a lot of interesting scenarios: the set of
MHI bicliques in G consists of all maximal isolated bicliques
(G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0) if G is a maximal biclique), all maximal
isolated bicliques + A-Cam, and all maximal isolated bicliques
+ P-Cam. Many real-world phenomena manifest themselves
as MHI bicliques. As mentioned before, fraud groups with A-
Cam are likely to form MHI bicliques. MHI bicliques can
also be found in many other applications such as retweet
boosting detection[8], [11], network intrusion[2], and genetic
applications[3], [19], [20]. Thus the following problem has a
wide range of applications:
Maximal Half Isolated Biclique Enumeration Problem
(MHIBP): In a bipartite graph G = (N ∪M,E), enumerate
all maximal half isolated bicliques.
Solving MHIBP indicates finding a special set of maximal
bicliques. This may have considerable significance in graph
theory and related areas. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first linear-time complexity solution. This could be of
independent interest.
In summary, we cast the group fraud detection problem as
discovering a special case of bicliques, MHI Bicliques. The
restricted nature of MHI Biclique avoids the intractability of
the standard biclique problems. In the rest of the paper, we
will introduce a linear time algorithm for MHIBP. We also
provide a few theoretical results and empirical study regarding
the excellent effectiveness and robustness of the algorithm,
especially when applied to the application of anti-fraud.
III. SUSPICIOUSNESS TREE
In this section, we introduce a novel data structure, denoted
by Suspiciousness Tree or S-Tree, for solving MHIBP and
variants. The idea is inspired by frequent-pattern tree (FP-
tree) in association rule mining[21]. To make it concrete, we
describe the scheme in the context of fraud detection which re-
quires a special score, denoted F-score that will be introduced
later. However, we stress that F-score is only essential for
fraud detection. It is easy to verify that, using F-score directly
for ordering nodes, or replacing it with frequency or simply
dictionary ranking of the node’s identifier, or any consistent
nodes ordering mechanism can solve the general MHIBP.
A. Constructing Baskets
The construction of S-tree starts with modeling each target
nodes with a structure called basket, which captures a target
node’s local connectivity. Formally, given a target node m ∈
M , the basket B(m) of m is constructed as:
B(m) = {m, I(m), f(m)} (1)
where m is the identifier of B(m). I(m) = {n ∈ N :
(n,m) ∈ E} is the set of source nodes that m is connected
with. f(m), called the F-score, is a preliminary estimate of
suspiciousness of B(m), using only information local to m.
F-score can be thought of as indicating how suspicious that
source nodes in I(m) appear in B(m) when the basket is
examined in isolation. The final suspiciousness of a source
node is determined globally by both the nodes’ F-scores and
the structure of the graph. In the following, we will first
introduce our choices of F-score that work well empirically.
We then present the mining algorithm that detects subgraphs
with high synchrony.
Determining f(m). Recall that we distinguish two modes:
AOBG and ARBG where the bipartite graphs model different
relations. ”Unusualness” is different in the two modes.
AOBG mode. When elements in M are objects, an edge
represents an interaction between an account and an object
(e.g., a product or a followee). Intuitively, a target node with
higher in-degree are less suspicious, since it has no incentive
to collude with fraudster for the acquisition of popularity (e.g.,
a celebrity on Twitter). In this case, we define f(m) as
f(m) = log(
|E|
|I(m)|+ c ), (2)
where c is a small constant to prevent excessive variability for
small values of |I(m)|. Note that Max(|I(m)|) + c < |E|.
This can also been thought of as the self-information or
surprisal [22] of a randomly chosen edge falls on a certain the
basket.
ARBG mode. In contrast, when nodes in M represent
resources (e.g., IP addresses, devices, etc.) that the accounts in
N use when interacting with the platform, a target node with
higher in-degree is more suspicious as resource sharing is a
key characteristic of group fraud. For example, it is highly
suspicious for more than 1k users to login on the same IP
address. In fact many works (e.g., [14], [15], [11], [12]) rely
on detecting such sharing. In this case, we define f(m) as
f(m) = log(|I(m)|+ c). (3)
By the transformation, we acquire the baskets B =
{B(m),∀m ∈ M} from G. And we use B(M) to denote
the set {B(m),∀m ∈ M}, and I(M) to denote the set
{I(m),∀m ∈M}.
Time Complexity. All baskets B can be constructed by one
scan of E. Therefore, the time complexity of constructing B
is O(|E|). Noticing that ∑m∈M |I(m)| = |E|.
B. Building Suspiciousness Tree
The basket captures the local connectivity of a target node.
Given a high-synchrony subgraph G(N ,M, ρ → 1.0), nodes
withinM have similar neighbor sets. This can be shown with a
toy example in Fig.1. The fraud group consisting of a set of tar-
get nodes {C,D,E} and a set of source nodes {d, e, f, g, h},
forming a dense subgraph. After baskets construction, C,D,E
Fraud Target Normal Target
a b c d e f g h i j k
A B C D E F G
Fraud Source Normal Source
M f(M) I(M)
A 1.6094 d,c,j,i,a
B 3.2188 b
C 1.6094 d,h,e,f,g
D 1.6094 d,h,e,f,g
E 1.6094 d,h,e,f,g
F 2.4849 k,c
G 2.0794 h,i,j
sn:d
sus:6.44
tn:{A,C,D,E}
sn:h
sus:4.83
tn:{CDE}
sn:e
sus:4.83
tn:{CDE}
sn:f
sus:4.83
tn:{CDE}
sn:g
sus:4.83
tn:{CDE}
sn:h
sus:2.08
tn:{G}
sn:i
sus:2.08
tn:{G}
sn:j
sus:2.08
tn:{G}
sn:c
sus:1.61
tn : {A}
sn:j
sus:1.61
tn: {A}
sn:i
sus:1.61
tn:{A}
sn:a
sus:1.61
tn:{A}
sn:k
sus:2.48
tn:{F}
sn:c
sus:2.48
tn:{F}
sn : b
sus:3.22
tn : {B}
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Fig. 1: Toy example of S-tree (Overflow)
result in identical neighbor sets: I(C) = I(D) = I(E).
Detecting high-synchrony subgraphs can be done efficiently
via clustering similar nodes together.
In addition to subgraphs with high synchrony, we also focus
on suspicious dense subgraphs. Consider a biclique formed by
(N ,M) and we assume N is a set of followers on Twitter.
Intuitively, (N ,M) is more suspicious if M is a set of
“nobody” instead of a group of celebrities. Thus, we propose
suspiciousness tree or S-tree. Compared to FP-tree[21], S-tree
has novel node structure, sorting metric, and increment method
when its node is shared.
The construction of a S-tree is a process of handling each
basket in B. Let T be the S-tree. A node x on T contains three
fields: sn, sus, and tn, where x.sn represents a particular node
of N or M , x.sus records a suspiciousness score for x, and
x.tn denotes a subset of associated nodes of M or N .
Within a basket, the source nodes are sorted by their total
suspiciousness scores g defined as
g(n) =
∑
m∈H(n)
f(m), (4)
where H(n) = {m ∈M : (n,m) ∈ E} is set of target nodes
that n has edge with. Metric of this from obeys two basic
properties (or ‘axioms’):
1) All other conditions being equal, the more frequent n is
in B, the greater g(n): |H(n)| ↑⇒ g(n) ↑.
2) All other conditions being equal, the more suspicious a
basket that n occurs in is, the greater g(n): f(m) ↑⇒
g(n) ↑.
Given B, S-tree T is built by Algorithm 1. Before inserting
B into T , for each B(m) ∈ B, we sort I(m) in a descending
order of g, which can provide better chances that the most
suspicious and frequent source nodes are ranked at the head
(line 1-2). Then, the construction begins from the root node
that has no children (line 3). We process each basket one by
one (line 4-15). In the process of processing one basket, we
insert each source node within the basket in order (line 6-
15). If a node to be inserted has already been shared on the
path of the tree, its suspiciousness and neighboring nodes will
be accumulated (Line 8-10). Otherwise, a new node will be
created (line 11-14).
Algorithm 1 S-tree construction
Require: B, g
Ensure: T
1: for each B(m) ∈ B do
2: sort I(m) in a descending order of g (Eq.(4))
3: R← T .root
4: for each B(m) ∈ B do
5: x← R
6: while I(m) 6= ∅ do
7: n← I(m).top() # remove and return the first node
in I(m)
8: if x has a child xˆ and xˆ.sn = n then
9: xˆ.sus← xˆ.sus+ f(m)
10: xˆ.tn← xˆ.tn ∪ {m}
11: else
12: xˆ← new node
13: xˆ.sn← n, xˆ.sus← f(m), xˆ.tn← {m}
14: x add a child xˆ
15: x← xˆ
16: return T
Definition 6 (Path p(x)). Given an S-tree T , let x be a node
of T , then p(x) denotes the set of nodes along the path from
the root node to x in T , with the root node excluded.
Observation 1 : dense subgraphs⇒ shared path. Consider
a dense subgraph G(N ,M, ρ→ 1.0). Then the basketsB(M)
are highly similar to each other. By sorting I(M) in terms of
g, there are better chances that I(M) share a common prefix,
denoted by N . Then B(M) will be mapped into a subtree of
S-tree, where ∀x ∈ p(xˆ), x.sn ∈ N , x.sus = ∑m∈M f(m),
and x.tn =M, if xˆ.sn is the last node of sorted N by g.
It is easy to verify that T has anti-monotonicity property:
Theorem 1. [The Anti-monotonicity Property] Let x be a node
of T . Then ∀c ∈ p(x), it must be that c.sus ≥ x.sus and
c.tn ⊇ x.tn.
Proof. The proof is obvious. When processing a basket B(m)
in Algorithm 1, and when a node n ∈ I(m) is added to the
tree, all its parent nodes’ sus fields will be incremented by
f(m) and their tn fields will be expended by {m}.
Time complexity. From the S-tree construction, the cost of
inserting a basket B(m) into S-tree is O(|I(m)|). Thus, the
construction of S-tree takes O(|E|) by inserting B.
Space complexity As a basket corresponds to a particular
path of S-tree, the size of S-tree is upper bounded by |E|.
It reaches the bound when no node-sharing happens in the
S-tree. And the depth of S-tree is bounded by Max(|I(m)|).
IV. DENSE SUBGRAPH MINING WITH S-TREE
Building upon the S-tree structure, we now introduce two
algorithms for dense subgraph mining. The former solves the
generic MHIBP, while the latter is designed specifically for
fraud group detection.
A. Algorithm for Solving MHIBP
Consider a maximal isolated biclique (MI biclique) and we
use MI biclique + A-Cam to denote an isolated biclique +
A-Cam that is not contained in other isolated bicliques + A-
Cam. We recall that MHI bicliques contain MI bicliques, MI
bicliques + A-Cam, and MI bicliques + P-Cam. First, let us
see how MHI biclique to be represented on S-tree.
A branch node is a node with more than one children. A
leaf node is a node without any child. We define a special
type of nodes as the following:
Definition 7 (Narrow Node). In an S-tree T , let x be a node
that is neither a leaf node nor branch node. And let c denote
the only child of x. Then x is a narrow node if x.tn ⊃ c.tn.
Then, we give the definition of maximal-shared path:
Definition 8 (Maximal-Shared Path). Given a path p(x), then
we call p(x) is a maximal-shared path if x is a leaf, branch
or narrow node.
Based on the two definitions, we have the following Theo-
rems. For brevity, we use [N ,M] to denote a biclqiue induced
by N and M.
Theorem 2. Given an MI biclqiue G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0), then
G must form a path p(x) where x is a leaf node in T .
Proof. Because G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0) is isolated, for each n ∈
N , n only occurs in B(M). Because ρ = 1.0, there must
be that ∀m1,m2 ∈ M, I(m1) = I(m2), based on the basket
construction. By Algorithm 1, I(M) must have same order and
B(M) must form a shared path p(x) where x is a leaf node
in T and it must hold that x.tn =M, x.sus =∑m∈M f(m),
and {c.sn,∀c ∈ p(x)} = N .
Theorem 3. Let T be the S-tree for M . Given an MI biclqiue
G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0) (+ A-Cam), then G must form a maximal-
shared path p(x) in T . Let M be the set ⋃c∈C c.tn where
C denotes the children of x, N be the set {c.sn,∀c ∈ p(x)}.
Then, [N , x.tn] must be an MI bilique (+ A-Cam) if x is a leaf
node and [N , (x.tn−M)] must be an MI bilique + A-Cam if x
is either a branch node or narrow node and (x.tn−M) 6= ∅.
Proof. A-Cam only introduces an edge pointed from a source
node n ∈ N to a target node m 6∈ M, thus the camouflage
does not change baskets B(M). Because ρ = 1.0 and
Theorem 2, B(M) must form a shared path p(x) where x
is last element of I(m),m ∈ M. Now, let us consider the
position of x in T .
First, suppose x is not a branch, leaf, or narrow node. Then
x must have exactly one child node c and c.tn = x.tn based
on Definition 7 and Theorem 1. Thus p(c) must be mapped by
[{c2.sn,∀c2 ∈ p(c)}, c.tn]. Because p(x) ⊂ p(c), we conclude
that [{c1.sn,∀c1 ∈ p(x)}, x.tn] ⊂ [{c2.sn,∀c2 ∈ p(c)}, c.tn],
which contradicts the definition of MI biclique(+ A-Cam).
Therefore x must be either a branch, leaf, or narrow node.
If x is a
1) branch node: [N , x.tn] must not be an MI biclique +
A-Cam, because for each m1 ∈ x.tn, ∃m2 ∈ x.tn, then
I(m1) 6= I(m2) due to |C| > 1, which is contradicted
to Theorem 2. If |x.tn| > |M|, then [N ,M] must not
be an MI biclique + A-Cam, because for each m1 ∈M,
∃n1 ∈ I(m1) satisfying n1 6∈ N , which is contradicted
to Definition 2. And, [N , (x.tn −M)] must be an MI
biclique + A-Cam, because ∀m ∈ (x.tn −M), I(m)
must be same and it is not contained in other MI biclique
+ A-Cam.
2) leaf node: Based on Theorem 2, [N , x.tn] must be an
MI biclique (+ A-Cam).
3) narrow node: x has one child c, x.tn ⊃ c.tn, and M is
c.tn. Then [N , (x.tn −M)] must be an MI biclique +
A-Cam (proof is same to the condition if x is a branch
node).
Therefore MI biclique(+ A-Cam) must form a maximal-shared
path and for each maximal-shared path p(x), [N , x.tn] must
be an MI bilique (+ A-Cam) if x is a leaf node and [N , (x.tn−
M)] must be an MI bilique + A-Cam if x is either a branch
node or narrow node and (x.tn−M) 6= ∅.
As previously mentioned, T is the S-tree for the target nodes
in G. We can also build the S-tree for the source nodes using
the same methods. We denote such an S-tree by T1.
Theorem 4. Let T1 be the S-tree for N . Given an MI biclqiue
G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0) (+ P-Cam), then G must form a maximal-
shared path p(x) in T1. Let M be the set
⋃
c∈C c.tn where
C denotes the children of x, N be the set {c.sn,∀c ∈ p(x)}.
Then, [N , x.tn] must be an MI bilique (+ P-Cam) if x is a leaf
node and [N , (x.tn−M)] must be an MI bilique + P-Cam if x
is either a branch node or narrow node and (x.tn−M) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof is same as the proof in Theorem 3.
Let G(N ,M, ρ = 1.0) denote an MI biclqiue. Based on
Theorem 2-4, we propose Algorithm 2-3 to catch all G (+
A-Cam) in T or G (+ P-Cam) in T1.
Algorithm 2 main
Require: T
Ensure: Gˆs
1: Gˆs← ∅
2: R← T.root
3: find MHI bicliques(R, Gˆs)
4: return Gˆs
Obviously, Algorithm 3 is a depth-first search algorithm. It
searches all leaf nodes (line 14-15), branch nodes (line 4-9),
and narrow nodes (line 10-13) by one scan all nodes. Thus Al-
gorithm 2-3 catch all maximal-shared paths and corresponding
G ( + A-Cam).
Theorem 5. Let GˆSs be the bicliques returned by running
Algorithm 2-3 on T , and GˆT s be the bicliques returned by
running Algorithm 2-3 on T1. Then Gˆs = merge(GˆSs, GˆT s)
(Algorithm 4) must be all MHI bicliques in G.
Algorithm 3 find MHI bicliques
Require: x, Gˆs
1: C ← x.childern
2: M← x.tn
3: A← {a.xn,∀a ∈ p(x)}
4: if |C| > 1 then
5: M′ ← ∅
6: for each c ∈ C do
7: M′ ←M′ ∪ c.tn
8: if |M| > |M′| then
9: Gˆs← Gˆs ∪ {(A,M−M′)}
10: if |C| = 1 then
11: M′ ← x.child.tn
12: if |M| > |M′| then
13: Gˆs← Gˆs ∪ {(A,M−M′)}
14: if |C| = 0 then
15: Gˆs← Gˆs ∪ {(A,M)}
16: return
17: for each xˆ ∈ C do
18: find MHI bicliques(xˆ, Gˆs)
Proof. Based Theorem 3 and Theorem 2, running Algorithm
2-3 on T detects all MI biclqiues (+ A-Cam), while running
Algorithm 2-3 on T1 finds all MI biclqiues (+ P-Cam). And
merge(GˆSs, GˆT s) deletes all repeated and contained bicliques.
Thus Algorithm 2-4 + S-tree solves MHIBP.
Algorithm 4 merge
Require: GˆSs, GˆT s
1: for each Gˆs ∈ {GˆSs, GˆT s} do
2: for each Gˆ ∈ Gˆs do
3: (N ,M)← Gˆ
4: n← N .top() # Return a node of N .
5: let p(x) be the path mapped by B(n) in Tˆ . # If
Gˆ ∈ GˆSs, Tˆ ← T1; Else Tˆ ← T
6: for each c ∈ p(x) do
7: if c is a leaf, branch, or narrow node then
8: G′ ← biclique represented by c # See
Theorem 3-4
9: if Gˆ ⊆ G′ then
10: remove Gˆ from Gˆs
11: return GˆSs + GˆT s
For each Gˆ ∈ GˆSs, there is a guarantee that Gˆ must be an MI
biclqiue (+ A-Cam). However, Gˆ may be contained in an MI
biclqiue + P-Cam. Algorithm 4 describes the way we merge
repeated or contained HI bicliques. Algorithm 4 efficiently
prunes unnecessary pairwise comparisons, where a Gˆ is only
compared with a subset of GˆT s. If Gˆ ⊆ G′, G′ must share each
source node (eg., n) in Gˆ and G′ must be represented by either
a leaf, branch, or narrow node on the shared path mapped by
B(n) on T1 (line 3-8).
B. Practical Algorithm for Fraud Group Detection
In the previous section we provide theoretical results on
MHIBP which essentially deals with subgraphs with full
synchrony (ρ = 1). In the real world, our target pattern (e.g.,
fraud groups) may not form a strict biclique, but a dense
subgraph. Let G(N ,M, ρ → 1.0) represent the subgraph
formed by a fraud group and t denote the subtree mapped
by G. Based on Observation 1, there will be a shared prefix
p(x) in t. Thus detecting G is equivalent to detecting p(x).
Building upon this property, we now introduce an algorithm
that effectively detects isolated-dense subgraphs with A-Cam
and/or P-Cam.
First, we set up two parameters, thickness and depth, which
define a suspiciousness boundary: a node x is suspicious if
the depth of x in T is more than depth and x.sus is greater
than thickness. The boundary selects the subtrees with shared
prefix that correspond to dense subgraphs. The algorithm is
described in Algorithm 4. We use x.descendant to denote
the set {c in T : x ∈ p(c)}.
Algorithm 5
Require: T , thickness, depth
1: Xsus ← ∅
2: Start search from the root node R.
3: Find all nodes X of which depth = depth.
4: for x in X do
5: if x.sus ≥ thickness then
6: Xsus ← Xsus + p(x) + x.descendant
7: return Xsus
In Algorithm 5, we retain the whole subtree (line 6) if
its shared prefix exceeds the threshold. This, however, may
result in false alarms (legit users being included in Xsus). We
propose the following metric to mitigate the issue.
Given Xsus, we calculate a suspiciousness score (s-score)
of a source node as:
s(n) =
∑
∀x∈Xsus
x.sus if x.sn == n. (5)
We sort all nodes in N in descending order of s, given Xsus.
S-score has a very nice property that helps suppressing false
positives: B(mi) may contain normal source nodes if some
normal users accidentally create edges pointed to mi. Given
a set of fraud source nodes N and a set of fraud target nodes
M, mi ∈ M, let ng denote a normal source node having an
edge with mi. Because ng should not have edges with the
majority of M while N does, i.e., ng only occurs in B(m)
while N frequently occurs in B(M). Thus, s(ng) is much
lower than s(N ).
Determining thickness and depth. The thresholds thickness
and depth can be determined empirically. In practice, we found
that choosing the averages works well:
thickness =
∑
∀x∈T x.sus
|T | ,
And,
depth =
|E| − |T |
|B| ,
where |T | denotes the number of nodes of T and |E| =∑
B(m)∈(B) |I(m)|. (|E| − |T |) denotes the number of source
nodes that are compacted to shared nodes in T , and the number
of paths in T is upper bounded by |B|. Thus, thickness is
average suspiciousness score of each node in S-tree. depth is
the average length of shared prefix of each subtree.
V. SUSPICIOUSNESS FOREST
In this section, we extend S-tree into S-forest to support
multimodal data.
A. 1 +K Dataset
S-forest handles what we call 1+K datasets. A 1+K dataset
D(X,A1, ..., AK) is a collection of entries each of which has
1 + K fields. The first field, denoted X , is an identifier for
that entry, often representing the entity that we are trying
to classify. The rest K fields, denoted by {A1, ..., AK}, are
attributes or features of this entity. The 1 +K formulation is
a very common data model applicable to any scenario where
a sample can be represented by an identifier and a number
of features. For example, in Twitter, a follow action can be
represented 1+3 by X = follower and 3 dimensional features
{followee, IP address, timestamp}.
B. Build Suspiciousness Forest
Given D(X,A1, ..., AK), for k ∈ {1, ...,K}, a bipartite
graph Gk is formed using values of X and Ak. An S-tree
Tk is then built on Gk using same method in Sec.4. Thus we
can obtain the S-forest: T = {T1, ...Tk, ...TK}.
S-forest is a natural extension of S-tree into multidimen-
sional data. Note that the features Ak can be either entities
or resources so the AOBG and ARBG modes we discussed
earlier are all special cases of S-forest (with K = 1). By
looking at 1 +K data, we can not only combine information
and modeling power from both AOBG and ARBG, but also
utilize more information from multiple dimensions.
For the purpose of detecting suspicious entities in X , we
propose the following suspiciousness score acquired from T,
which is simply a weighted sum of suspiciousness scores by
each individual tree:
S(n) =
K∑
k=1
wksk(n), (6)
where the sk(n) is the s(n) of computed on Tk by equation 5.
wk is the weight of Tk. wk’s can be automatically regressed
when labeled data are available. Or they can be determined
empirically. In our experiments, we found the following simple
form works well:
wk = log qk,
where qk is the number of unique values of Ak. The intuition
behind this choice is as follows. First, since each entry in
D corresponds to an edge in Gk, all the bipartite graphs
have equal number of edges. Unique values of Ak correspond
to target nodes in Gk. The larger qk is, the sparser Gk.
Let pk = 1/qk which can be interpreted as the probability
that a random edge lands on any particular target node (i.e.,
value of Ak), assuming target nodes are selected according to
uniform distribution. wk = log qk = log 1pk is simply the self
information or surprisal of such an event, which we use to
represent how unusual or suspicious the graph is.
Analysis. S-forest uses an additive model to ensemble mul-
tiple graphs built on different features. This property, together
with S-tree’s capability for detecting dense subgraphs on a
single graph, makes S-forest superior in several aspects. We
show two examples in the following, which will be validated
by experiments in section VI-B.
Property 1: Detecting Groups with Overlap. We have
observed that when there are groups with overlapping nodes,
existing approaches such as [11], [2], [12], [13] fail to detect
them while S-forest can. The reason is as follows. Fig.2
represents a typical case of two overlapping groups. Two fraud
groups A and B form two dense subgraphs on two graphs
respectively. LetW be the set of common source nodes shared
by A and B. W will appear in both the subtrees formed by
A and B. Let the S-scores of A and B be S(A) and S(B),
respectively, then S(W) = S(A) + S(B). The elevation of
S(W) does not decrease S(A) or S(B). With properly chosen
threshold, all nodes in A ∪B can be detected by S-forest.
Unfortunately, the approaches such as [11], [2], [12], [13]
that detect the dense blocks in tensors may not work. Lacking
a way to aggregate or select key features, they resort to a
greedy method for dense blocks detection. As a result, they
can detect the densest blockW . However, onceW is detected
and removed, the remaining blocks become sparse and are
likely to be missed.
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Fig. 2: Group overlap
Property 2: Automatic Discovery of Critical Features. One
of the challenges in group fraud detection is the issue of feature
selection. Fraud groups do not show synchrony on all features,
but only a few key dimensions. However, these key features
are not known in advance, and they change with time and
fraud groups. A robust detection algorithm must be able to
discover such key features automatically. None of the existing
approaches such as [2], [12], [13] performs satisfactorily in
this regard. They either rely on hand-crafted feature weighting
or treat all features equally, resulting in the inability to adapt
to changes or handle exploded feature combinations when the
number of dimensions is high.
S-forest, however, greatly mitigates this problem. With S-
forest, each feature is examined individually. The final score is
aggregated via weighted addition. Information from different
features is automatically accumulated without the need for
explicit feature selection or combination. As will be shown
by experiments in section VI-B, S-forest performs much more
stably on high-dimensional data.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
TABLE III: Datasets used in experiments. ‘dims’ represents
‘dimensions’
S-tree S-forest
datasets edges dims datasets entries dims
AmazonOffice[23] 53K 2 YelpChi[24] 67K 4
AmazonBaby[23] 160K 2 YelpNYC[24] 359K 4
AmazonTools[23] 134K 2 YelpZip[24] 1.14M 4
AmazonFood[23] 1.3 M 2 DARPA[25] 4.55M 4
AmazonVideo[23] 583K 2 AirFore[26] 4.89 M 8
AmazonPet[23] 157K 2 Registration 26k 6
Twitter[27] 1.47B 2
We implemented S-tree and S-forest in Python and con-
ducted extensive experiments using both public and propri-
etary datasets against several strong competing algorithms
representing state of the art technology in fraud detection.
We use their official open-source implementations for all the
competing algorithms. All experiments were run on a server
with 2 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon E5 CPUs and 32 GB memory.
Since S-tree and S-forest apply to different datasets, the
experiments can be classified into two categories: evalua-
tions of S-tree on 2-dimensional data and S-forest on multi-
dimensional data. Table III shows the details about the datasets
used for each case. We also have to choose different competing
algorithms for comparison since they too apply to data with
different dimensionalities.
Evaluation Metrics. We run S-tree and S-forest on a total
of 13 datasets. Among them, the Registration is a propri-
etary dataset from an e-commerce provider’s log. The rest
are publicly available. The six Amazon datasets and Twitter
dataset are unlabeled. There are two methods to obtain labels
for evaluation. For the Amazon datasets, we perform the
standard dense subgraph injection to synthesize fraud groups,
which is a commonly-used method in fraud detection research
[11], [8]. For the Twitter dataset, we take the same approach
as Fraudar [11] and cross-reference known sources to find
suspicious accounts. Details will be provided next. Once labels
are obtained, we evaluate the performance using standard
metric F1-score or AUC.
A. Experiments with S-tree
We compared S-tree against two algorithms that are ap-
plicable to this situation (mining bipartite graph for dense
subgraphs) and have achieved the strongest performance so
far: Fraudar[11] and CatchSync[8]. Fraudar adapts the well-
known algorithm [28] for the densest subgraph problem to the
weighted bipartite graph situation, which has been shown to be
effective in fraud group detection. However, Fraudar, tries to
find a subgraph maximizing the density metric F = |M|·|N||M|+|N | .
When the sizes of M and N are unbalanced (e.g., when
|N |  |M|, as is common in many fraud groups), Fraudar
performs poorly, since in this case F → |M| and it is possible
that subgraphs induced by legit nodes have bigger values in
terms of F .
CatchSync detects dense subgraphs leveraging node degree
and HITS[6]. However, it is vulnerable to camouflaging: both
A-Cam and P-Can can change the connectivity between fraud
nodes and legit nodes, altering their degrees and HITS’s
dramatically.
[Amazon Datasets][23]. We first run the algorithms on
six collections of reviews for different types of commodities
on Amazon (Table III). We designed two subgraph injection
schemes: the first is to examine in detail the performances for
detecting HIM bicliques (ρ = 1) and dense subgraphs (ρ < 1);
the second is for more general performance evaluation.
[Injection Scheme 1]. To simulate the attack models
of fraudsters, we use the same approach as [11], [8] and
generate datasets by injecting a fraud group with varying
configurations into AmazonOffice. The injected fraud group
is set as G(|N | = 200, |M| = λ, ρ) where λ denotes the
number of fraud target nodes and ρ follows Definition 1.
We also introduce two perturbations: (1) unbalanced dense
subgraph created by varying λ; and (2) randomly generated
A-Cam or P-Cam. Let θ denote the number of camouflage
edges for each node in N orM. We set θ = λ or θ = 0.5λ in
the experiments. We set ρ = 1.0 and ρ = 0.6 to represent
the different cases of detecting HIM bicliques and dense
subgraphs, respectively.
1) Detection of HIM Bicliques (ρ = 1.0) : Fig.3 shows the
performance of each algorithm on detecting HIM bicliques.
The x-axises are λ (varying from 0 to 25), and y-axises
are the best-F1 scores. A few conclusions are clear: (1)
Without camouflage, both S-tree and CatchSync attain perfect
accuracy, even when λ is reduced to 2. This is not surpris-
ing. Since isolated-unbalanced bicliques must form maximal-
shared paths, they can be detected accurately by S-tree. At the
same time, since HIM Bicliques’ HITS and degree values are
very prominent, CatchSync also obtains the same performance.
On the other hand, Fraudar’s inability for handling unbalanced
dense subgraph is clearly demonstrated by the experiments. (2)
Both S-tree and Fraudar show resistance in face of camouflage.
In contrast, camouflage destroys CatchSync’s effectiveness, as
HITs score and degree of fraud source node change dramati-
cally as the number of camouflage edges increases.
Fig. 3: Performance on AmazonOffice (ρ = 1.0)
2) Detection of Dense Subgraphs: ρ = 0.6: When ρ is
reduced to 0.6, the performance of all algorithms decrease,
as shown in Fig.4. Not surprisingly, S-tree still outperforms
Catchsync and Fraudar in face of camouflage, especially for
dense subgraphs with large sizes. Let us take a closer look at
a concrete data point: camouflage θ = λ = 20. In this case,
the average degree of a fraud group is only 11.32, which is
lower than a group formed by normal users. This caused a
large number of false positives for Fraudar. The number of
camouflage edges of each user reaches 20 so that its degree
and HITs score have no difference with normal ones, which
accounts for the deterioration of CatchSync’s performance. For
S-tree, however, 20 baskets of fraud target nodes are mapped
into two shared subtrees in S-tree, resulting in anomalously
high suspiciousness scores and almost perfect accuracy.
Fig. 4: Performance on AmazonOffice (ρ = 0.6)
[Injection Scheme 2]. In this experiment, we inject 10
fraud groups G(N| = 200,M = λ, ρ) into AmazonOffice,
AmazonBaby, AmazonTools, AmazonFood, AmazonVideo,
and AmazonBook. λ and ρ are randomly chosen from [5, 50]
and [0.6, 1.0], respectively. Out of the 10 fraud groups, 3 of
them are augmented with A-Cam, and another 3 augmented
with P-Cam. In all the camouflage cases we set θ = λ. The
results are shown in Table IV. Overall, S-tree is the most robust
and performs best across all variations and camouflages.
TABLE IV: Performance(AUC) on the [Amazon] datasets
AmazonOffice AmazonBaby AmazonTools
Fraudar 0.9415 0.8674 0.9264
CatchSync 0.8412 0.8190 0.7907
S-tree 0.9987 0.9595 0.9389
AmazonFood AmazonVideo AmazonBook
Fraudar 0.6915 0.7361 0.8923
CatchSync 0.7412 0.6990 0.7634
S-tree 0.8558 0.8756 0.9435
[Twitter Dataset[27]]. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
S-tree on a very large social graph, we run it on the Twitter
Dataset [27], a graph containing 41.7 million users and 1.47
billion follows over July 2009. The dataset does not contain
any labels.
First of all, the algorithm is very fast. It took only ten hours
to finish on a single server with two CPUs.
S-tree detects a suspicious group with 5531 followers. To
further validate the group, we randomly sample 150 followers
for hand labeling to determine how many of them appear
fraudulent. To do this, we label which users are fraudulent
based on the following characteristics: first, we check how
many accounts in this group are deleted or suspended (pe-
nalized by Twitter) 1; second, we inspect Tweets of these ac-
counts that whether contain the URLs of two known follower-
buying services, TweepMw, and TweeterGetter, which shows
if they had involved in fraudulent activities. We sample 200
followers and investigate of their profiles, 43.2% of de-
tected accounts(followers) have tweets advertising TweepMe
or Tweetergetter, and additional 34.6% are deleted, protected
or suspended. In comparison, we choose two non-sharing
subtrees of S-tree using the same investigation, we find that
none of the accounts has tweets advertising and only a few
accounts are deleted. Thus, the results further support the
effectiveness of S-tree.
B. Experiments with S-forest
For multi-dimensional data, we compare S-forest against
four strong rivals. CrossSpot[12], M-Zoom[2], M-Biz[29] and
D-Cube [13] all detect dense blocks in tensors. For CrossSpot,
we set the random initialization seeds as 400, 500 and 600.
For M-Zoom and D-Cube, we use three metrics they supported
in [2], [13] and choose the one with the best accuracy. We
evaluate each methods’ performance in terms of ranking of
suspiciousness of source nodes. Experiments were conducted
on a number of datasets described below.
[DARPA] DARPA[25] was collected by the Cyber Systems
and Technology Group in 1998. It is a collection of network
connections, some of which belong to TCP attacks. Each
connection contains source IP, target IP, timestamp. Thus the
dataset can be model as D(connection, source IP, target IP,
timestamp). The dataset includes labels indicating whether
each connection is malicious or not. We run CrossSpot, M-
zoom, and D-cube on the tensor formed by D. Table V
gives the performance of each method for detecting malicious
connections. S-forest evidently surpasses the best previous
accuracy created by D-Cube.
[AirForce] AirForce [26] is a dataset used for KDD Cup
1999, which has been used in M-Zoom and D-Cube. It
includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military
network environment. However, it does not contain any spe-
cific IP address. Following D-Cube[13], we also use the same
seven features and model it as an 1+K dataset: D(connection,
protocol, service, src bytes, dst bytes, flag, host count, srv
count) 2. The dataset includes labels indicating whether each
connection is malicious or not. Table V presents the result of
each method. S-forest achieves the best accuracy.
1https://tweeterid.com/
2Please see http://www.cs.cmu.edu/˜kijungs/codes/dcube/supple.pdf for de-
tailed description of the fields.
TABLE V: Performance(AUC) on the [DARPA] and [Air-
Force] dataset
Dataset DARPA AirForce
CrossSpot 0.923 0.924
M-Zoom 0.923 0.975
M-Biz 0.923 0.975
D-Cube 0.930 0.987
S-forest 0.942 0.991
[Yelp] [24]. YelpChi, YelpNYC, and YelpZip are three
datasets collected by [30] and [24] containing review ac-
tions for restaurants on Yelp. They all can be modeled as
D(restaurant, user, rating-star, timestamp). In these datasets,
our task is to detect fraudulent restaurants that purchase
fake reviews. The three datasets all include labels indicating
whether each review is fake or not. A restaurant is labeled as
“fraudulent” if the number of fake reviews it receives exceeds
40. Table VI shows the results.
TABLE VI: Performance(AUC) on the [YELP] datasets
YelpChi YelpNYC YelpZip
CrossSpot 0.9905 0.9328 0.9422
M-Zoom 0.9850 0.9255 0.9391
M-Biz 9850 0.9229 0.9302
Dcube 0.9857 0.9232 0.9391
S-forest 0.9945 0.9406 0.9456
[Registration Dataset] To test S-forest’s performance on
real-world fraud detection task, we obtained real registration
data from a major e-commerce provider. The data contains
26k registration entries sampled from the vendor’s production
system during a three-day period. Each entry contains an
account id and multiple features such as IP subset, phone,
and osType. Some of the accounts were registered by bots
and were later sold to fraudsters who then conducted various
frauds using them. These sampled accounts were tracked for
several months and were labeled fraudulent if they were found
to engage in frauds by human experts. A total of 10k fraud
accounts were identified.
To verify the automatic key feature discovery capability
of S-forest, we did very little feature engineering and re-
tained most information from the log. We formulated data
as 1 + 5 model: D(account, phone-prefix, IP-prefix, osType,
phone-prefix-3, is-same-province), where is-same-province is
a Boolean value indicating if the IP and phone of a user
come from a same province or not. Among the five features,
phone and IP are two critical features where only malicious
accounts exhibit strong resource sharing pattern, while osType,
phone-3, and is-same are three noise features where both legit
and malicious accounts form dense subgraphs. We conducted
five experiments, each with different feature sets. Results are
shown in Table VII.
Clearly, S-forest outperforms other baselines by large mar-
gins across all configurations. Specifically, when the noise
features are added, the performance of CrossSpot, M-Zoom,
M-Biz, and D-Cube deteriorates while S-forest stays stable.
This is due to the fact that these algorithms did not differentiate
the importances of different features in identifying frauds and
were misled by clustering on some irrelevant features. S-forest,
on the other hand, is capable of automatically focusing on
critical features while ignoring noisy perturbations.
The closer investigation uncovers more detailed differences.
First, we found that the sizes of fraud groups vary widely,
ranging from tens to thousands. Other algorithms miss some
groups with small sizes, since they appear to be low-density
to them. One particular fraud group consists of 75 accounts
that use the same IP subnet. The group forms an extremely
unbalanced dense subgraph since the number of target nodes
(IP subnet) is only 1. The other algorithms all fail to detect it.
TABLE VII: Performance (AUC) on [Registration] dataset. ‘C’
represents ‘critical feature’ and ‘N’ represents ‘noise feature’.
1 C 2 C 2C +1N 2C + 2N 2C+3N
CrossSpot 0.7471 0.7312 0.7307 0.7539 0.8099
M-zoom 0.7544 0.8880 0.8409 0.8754 0.6802
M-Biz 0.7577 0.8842 0.8409 0.8674 0.6812
D-Cube 0.7601 0.9201 0.8532 0.8723 0.7102
S-forest 0.7678 0.9961 0.9964 0.9876 0.9976
Second, another example confirms our earlier analysis that
other algorithms have difficulty handing overlapping groups.
We found in the data that there is one fraud group A formed
on IP subnet and another group B formed on phone-prefix-7.
There are some overlapping users who share both two features.
S-forest correctly detected both A and B while other methods
missed A \A ∩B.
C. Scalability and Efficiency
Fig. 5: S-tree/S-forest has linear-time complexity and is faster
than other state-of-the-art methods
As mentioned before, building S-tree takes O(2|E|) time
and all algorithms only need one scan of S-tree. To verify
this linear complexity, we recorded S-tree’s running time on
AmazonApp data [23]. We vary the scale by subsampling the
edges. Fig.5 (1) shows the linear scaling of S-tree’s running
time in the number of edges. In addition, for comparison, we
show the running time of S-tree, CatchSync and Fraudar on
AmazonBaby and AmazonFood datasets in Fig.5(2). S-tree is
faster than the two, especially when the number of edges is
large. In fact, Fraudar needs O(|E|log|N |) time for detecting
a single fraud group (and there typically exist multiple fraud
groups in a dataset) and CatchSync needs to calculate HITS
score. Both are slow for large-scale data. (3) S-forest also is
linear scaling with entries of datasets, and is much faster than
other state-of-the-art methods.
VII. RELATED WORK
Algorithms for maximal biclique. Enumerating all maximal
bicliques cannot be solved in polynomial time [18] and people
often place restrictions on it to find maximal bicliques effi-
ciently. Algorithms for finding maximal bicliques in a bipartite
graph can be classified into three lines. The first is exhaustively
search-based approaches [19], [20]: build all subsets of one
vertex partition, find their intersections in the other partition,
and check each for maximality. However, they must generally
place restrictions on the problem to stem the enormous search
space. The second line relies on graph inflation [31]: transform
the problem into finding all maximal cliques in a graph by
adding possible edges. The third line is based on association
mining. [32] and [33] find all maximal bicliques respec-
tively based on [34] and [35]. Certainly, their computational
cost is huge. Moreover, biclique can be transformed into
frequent itemsets in transactional databases. Thus, frequent
itemset mining methods [36], [37], [38], [34] may be helpful
in finding maximal bicliques. However, they cannot solve
maximal bicliques or MHI bicliques enumeration problem
in polynomial time. Various restrictions on either inputs or
outputs are proposed to find maximal bicliques, including
bounding the maximum input degree[39], bounding an inputs
arboricity[18], bounding the minimum biclique size[19], and
figure-of-merit[20]. Naturally, the algorithms relying on these
restrictions do not account for MHIBP.
Mining dense subgraphs for fraud detection. Mining dense
subgraphs [11], [40], [9], [5], [4] is effective for detecting
the fraud groups of users and objects connected by a massive
number of edges. Fraudar [11] tries to find a subgraph with
the maximal average degree using a greedy algorithm. [41],
[10] adapt singular-value decomposition (SVD) to capture
abnormal dense user blocks. Furthermore, Belief propagation
[4], [5], HITS-like ideas [7], [8], [42] are all adapted to detect
high-density signals of fraud groups in a graph. FraudEagle
[4] uses the Loopy Belief Propagation to assign labels to nodes
in the network represented by Markov Random Field.
Detecting high-density signal in tensors. Multimodal
data can be treated as tensors and many works mine the
tensors directly for dense blocks. [14], [15] discover time
constraint of fraudsters and provide a way to combine multiple
features to spot fraud. [43] spots dense blocks using CP
decomposition[44]. However, as observed in [12], using tensor
decomposition techniques usually find blocks with low density,
and are outperformed by search-based methods. CrossSpot
[12] starts the search from random seeds and greedily add
values into the block until it reaches the local optimum. M-Biz
[29] utilizes similar methods but adjust the block by adding or
deleting values from it. M-Zoom[2] and D-Cube[13] are both
find the densest block by greedily deleting values from the
tensor until it reaches the maximal value in terms of a density
metric.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced and addressed a new, restricted
biclique problem (MHIBP), motivated by real malicious pat-
tern in fraud campaign. In addition to the MHIBP solver, we
proposed a practical algorithm that focuses on near bicliques,
which is applicable to catching fraud groups in a wide range
of situations. Our algorithms are based on two novel structures
S-tree, and its extension, S-forest. The problem and algorithms
may have interesting applications in other areas such as
bioinformatics and social network analysis which we plan to
pursue as future work.
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